The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' Open Payments program implements Section 6002 of the Affordable Care Act requiring medical product manufacturers to report payments made to physicians or teaching hospitals as well as ownership or investment interests held by physicians in the manufacturer. To determine the characteristics and distribution of these industry payments by specialty, we analyzed physician payments made between August 1, 2013, and December 31, 2013, that were publicly disclosed by Open Payments. We compared payments between specialty types (medical, surgical, and other) and across specialties within each type using the Pearson c 2 test and the Kruskal-Wallis test. The number of physicians receiving payments was compared with the total number of active physicians in each specialty in 2012. We also analyzed physician ownership interests. Allopathic and osteopathic physicians received 2.43 million payments totaling $475 million. General payments represented 90% of payments by total value ($430 million) (per-physician median, $100; interquartile range [IQR], $31-$273; mean AE SD, $1407AE$23,766), with the remaining 10% ($45 million) as research payments (median, $2365; IQR, $592-$8550; mean AE SD, $12,880AE$66,743). Physicians most likely to receive general payments were cardiovascular specialists (78%) and neurosurgeons (77%); those least likely were pathologists (9%). Reports of ownership interest in reporting entities included $310 million in dollar amount invested and $447 million in value of interest held by 2093 physicians. In conclusion, the distribution and characteristics of industry payments to physicians varied widely by specialty during the first half-year of Open Payments reporting. 
T he recently debuted Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' (CMS) Open Payments transparency program establishes a national database of industry payments to physicians and teaching hospitals. 1 Financial relationships between medical product manufacturers and physicians have long been a source of concern to patients and policymakers alike. These concerns have grown in recent years as research continues to show the ways in which these widely prevalent relationships 2 may affect treatment decisions and may drive health care costs due to inappropriate utilization. 3, 4 In their report calling for broad transparency of industry-physician relationships, the Institute of Medicine "defines a conflict of interest as existing when an individual or institution has a secondary interest.
that creates a risk of undue influence on decisions or actions affecting a primary interest (eg, the conduct of objective and trustworthy medical research). This definition frames a conflict of interest in terms of the risk of such undue influence and not the actual occurrence of bias." 3,p26 In many cases, industry-physician financial relationships, from transfers of value as small as a meal or gift to those for royalties and licensing fees, create a conflict of interest. [3] [4] [5] As a result of concerns about these financial conflicts of interest, several legislative efforts have been made over the years to increase transparency with respect to industry-physician relationships. Before Open Payments implementation, several states enacted laws requiring various levels of disclosure of industry payments to physicians, 6 including full transparency, disclosure to the state, compliance with professional guidelines, 7 and limits on gifts. However, only 8 states had such laws before Open Payments implementation. 6 In addition to these laws, several pharmaceutical and device manufacturers publicly disclosed payments, although with varying detail. 8 Kesselheim et al, 9 in their evaluation of Massachusetts physician payment transparency data, found wide variation among specialties. They speculated that there may be differences in industry incentive to engage in such relationships or that specialties may have differences in the acceptance of these relationships.
Federal policymakers have attempted to increase the transparency of industry-physician financial relationships, although attempts between 2002 and 2009 failed to gain enough support for the bills to pass. [10] [11] [12] Finally, in 2010, the Physician Payment Sunshine Act was signed into law as Section 6002 of President Obama's Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 13 leading to establishment of the Open Payments program. The stated goal of the Sunshine Act and Open Payments is to "shed light on the nature and extent of [industry-physician] relationships and . hopefully discourage the development of inappropriate relationships and help prevent the increased and potentially unnecessary health care costs that can arise from such conflicts." 1,p9549 The Open Payments data release was updated in December 2014 and includes 4.5 million records of $3.7 billion in total value for payments occurring between August 1, 2013, and December 31, 2013. These data, despite representing only 5 months of 2013, are the most comprehensive to date describing physician-industry relationships in the United States. Physician payments reported to Open Payments include payments of greater than $10 or $100 in aggregate annually (adjusted based on the consumer price index), with notable exceptions, including product samples, discounts, charity care, and patient educational materials. 1 Much of the existing literature on the Open Payments program is speculative, published before availability of the data, but provides important insight into the possible uses and impact of the data. For example, Rosenthal and Mello 14 speculated on the use of Open Payments data by attorneys, insurance carriers, researchers, policymakers, and patients. The debate on the influence of conflicts of interest on physician decision making is ongoing, [14] [15] [16] with researchers acknowledging that there is little evidence to answer such questions. Analysis of these newly available data may bring a better understanding of the differences and commonalities between specialties in their relationships with industry. Such knowledge may help determine how to assess the appropriateness of these relationships and their effects on clinical practice and may help inform evidence-based advocacy efforts as ongoing federal transparency efforts shift the landscape of disclosure for physicians.
The purpose of this study was to characterize Open Payments program records of industry payments to physicians and determine how these payments vary by specialty. We hypothesized that there would be differences in the characteristics and distribution of payments by physician specialty.
METHODS
The Open Payments database allows for physician-level industry payment calculations and aggregation for analysis of broader characteristics by specialty. We performed a retrospective analysis of the most recent (December 2014) publicly available release of Open Payments data on industry payments (>$10 or $100 in aggregate annually) to identified physicians made between August 1, 2013, and December 31, 2013. The CMS excludes resident and manufacturer employee physicians. The data released also include payments to teaching hospitals, but these are beyond the scope of this article. Payments to recipient physicians were available in identified and deidentified databases. Identified physician payments included records of payments or other transfer of value (physician payments) to a specific physician and included physician specialty designation. Recipient physicians include allopathic and osteopathic specialties and other practitioners designated as physicians by the CMS. We further limited this analysis to allopathic and osteopathic physician specialties that could be matched with the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile count of active physicians. 17 Data were aggregated by physician specialty type (medical, surgical, and other) and by specialty within each type.
Medical specialties include allergy and immunology, dermatology, family medicine and general practice, cardiovascular disease, gastroenterology, internal medicine, pediatrics, and pediatric cardiology. Surgical specialties include colorectal surgery, neurosurgery, obstetrics and gynecology, ophthalmology, oral and maxillofacial surgery, orthopedic surgery, otolaryngology, plastic surgery, surgery (general), thoracic surgery, and urology. Other specialties include anesthesiology, emergency medicine, neurology, pathology, psychiatry, radiology, and other. A listing of the specialty groupings is provided to delineate the specialty taxonomy used for this analysis (Supplemental Table 1 , available online at http://www. mayoclinicproceedings.org). Records include information on reporting manufacturers, physicians, payments, associated drugs or devices, and ownership interests.
We characterized payments as general or research. General payments include all forms of payment other than those for research activities, which are classified under research payments (defined in the next paragraph). General payments were also characterized by form of payment or the modality used to transfer payment, including cash or cash equivalent; in-kind items and services; dividend, profit, or other return on investment'; and stock, stock option, or other ownership interest (ownership interest). General payments were further classified by nature of payment, or the reason the general payment was made. The CMS provides descriptive titles for each nature of payment classification and has examples of payment types that were developed with stakeholder input available on their website (https://www.cms.gov/ OpenPayments/About/Natures-of-Payment.html, accessed ). An adapted version of the CMS descriptions is given in Supplemental Table 2 (available online at http://www. mayoclinicproceedings.org).
Research payments include any direct compensation, funding for coordination or implementation, or study participant expense payment associated with research activities. 1 Research is defined in the regulations as "a systematic investigation designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge relating broadly to public health, including behavioral and social-sciences research. This term encompasses basic and applied research and product development." 1,p9482 Research-related payments are reported separately from general payments due to the complexity of research programs. 1 In addition, certain research payments qualify for delayed publication if they are related to new, additional applications of or clinical investigations regarding a drug, biologic, device, or medical supply. 1 Research payments are not required to report an expenditure category (similar to nature of payment for general payments) because there are often several, although the option to report such a category is available. Ninety-one percent of research payment records did not specify an expenditure category; therefore, we did not further explore this classification. We present summarized aggregate data, data by specialty type, and data by physician specialty (organized by specialty type). Payment characteristics analyzed included number of payment reports, value of payments, and per-physician median and mean payment amounts.
Last, we characterized physician and immediate family member ownership interests in manufacturers. Ownership interests include any ownership or investment interests of physicians or immediate family members in a reporting entity (applicable manufacturer or group purchasing organization) required to report payments. 1 Ownership interests include stocks, stock options, partnership shares, limited liability company membership(s), and loans, bonds, or other financial instruments secured by the reporting entity; notable exclusions include ownership interests received as compensation (until exercised), as part of a retirement plan, or interest in a publicly traded security or mutual fund. 1 Unless listed under general payments, ownership interests must be held within the defined reporting period but are not necessarily transferred. To characterize ownership and investment interest data, we used the CMS terms amount invested and value of interest to delineate the original amount of the interest holding or transfer of value and the cumulative value of that ownership interest in the reporting entity at the end of the reporting period, respectively. 18 Ownership interest characteristics analyzed included the number of ownership interests held and the total and per-physician median dollar amounts invested and value of interest.
We analyzed how payment and ownership interest characteristics vary among specialty types and across physician specialties within each type using the Pearson c 2 test and the Kruskal-Wallis test where applicable. We compared the number of physicians receiving payments with the total number of active physicians in each specialty in 2012 17 to estimate the proportion of physicians receiving payment and holding ownership interest. Allopathic and osteopathic physicians received 2.4 million payments totaling $475 million ( Table 2 ). Figure 1 shows the distribution of payments among allopathic and osteopathic specialties. Internal medicine and orthopedic surgery had the greatest total value ($111 million each) ( Figure 1, A) ; however, payments were distributed to a greater number of internal medicine physicians vs orthopedic surgeons (77,515 vs 15,459). The medical specialties that received the greatest number of payments were cardiovascular disease (78%) and gastroenterology (68%). The proportion of physicians receiving payment was significantly different between specialty types and by specialty within each type (P<.001 for all tests). Form of payments ( Figure 1) General payments represented $430 million (90%) of the total value of payments to allopathic and osteopathic physicians (per-physician median, $100; interquartile range [IQR], $31-$273; mean AE SD, $1407AE$23,766) and 2.4 million (99%) of the number of records. The remaining $45 million (10%) of the total value was research payments (median, $2365; IQR, $592-$8550; mean AE SD, $12,880AE$66,743). Thoracic surgery, cardiovascular disease, and urology had the highest median general payments, and orthopedic surgery, neurosurgery, 
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and neurology had the highest mean value of general payments per physician (Figure 1, B) . The value of general payments was significantly different between specialty types and by specialty within each type (P<.001 for all tests). The distribution of the nature of payments by specialty type can be found in Figure 2 and Supplemental 
DISCUSSION
This analysis of an unprecedented volume of physician-specific data on industry-related financial conflicts of interest shows wide variability in the prevalence and characteristics of industry payments to physicians by specialty. Although important analyses of Open Payments manufacturer and product data exist, 19, 20 little attention has been given to characteristics of physician data. A report by Jarvies et al 20 gave an initial account of the first release of Open Payments data in September 2014, focusing largely on manufacturer and product data. However, the data provided regarding physician specialties were limited to 5 specialties and provided aggregates that included ownership and investment interests in the totals, despite the difference in reporting of these records. Useful aggregation and analyses of Open Payments manufacturer and product data are also available from ProPublica 19 and from the CMS in their recent report to Congress, 21 although little attention has been given to characteristics of physician data. Before the enactment of Open Payments, ProPublica also assembled a separate important database of industry-physician financial relationships 22 containing $4 billion in payments disclosed by 17 pharmaceutical companies between 2009 and 2013. Compared with the 4-year period evaluated by ProPublica, the Open Payments data presented herein report on a 5-month period that contains data on nearly the same total value of payments ($3.7 billion in total).
The present findings are also important because the specialty variation in this analysis demonstrates that further interpretation of the impact of industry payments on physician decision making, health care costs, and utilization must incorporate the specialty-specific context of these data. We found significant differences in the distribution and median values of payments by specialty type and by specialty within each type. We found that general medical specialties (internal medicine and family medicine/general practice) were the target of a large proportion of industry payments (1.2 million of 2.4 million total [50%]), although the value of these payments tended to be lower than those of other specialties ($133 million of $475 million [28%] paid to allopathic and osteopathic specialties in this analysis). In addition, the medical specialties that involve a greater amount of intervention (cardiovascular disease, gastroenterology, and dermatology) had the highest proportion of physicians receiving industry payments. These data are consistent with previous evidence showing wide variation among specialties in an early evaluation of Massachusetts physician payment transparency data 9 and in physician self-reports. 2, 23 These evaluations also found a high prevalence of payments with specialty variability and high values of payments attributed to cardiology and orthopedic surgery. In addition, these data differ from the Massachusetts data in the nature of payments by providing additional detail to the distribution of payments, where a large proportion of Massachusetts payments fell under the broad category of "compensation for bona fide services." 9 Other analyses of Open Payments data also found similar variation among a limited number of surgical specialties, [24] [25] [26] although a comprehensive analysis of medical and other specialties is absent. Certain specialties may have greater research and development involvement, resulting in royalty/license payments. 27 Comparisons between surgical, medical, and other specialties in these findings show distinct payment distributions and characteristics in each specialty type, with greater royalty/license payments in surgical specialties compared with medical and other specialties. In addition, these findings are consistent with an analysis showing the broad extent of financial interaction between orthopedic surgery and industry, 26 a field with long-standing financial relationships 28 and a history of recent problematic relationships with device manufacturers influencing the dissemination of research results. 27, 29 Whether transparency will impede valuable collaborations and the pace of innovation also requires ongoing evaluation, as does further investigation into the appropriateness of these financial relationships. For example, the influence of payments of greater value (orthopedic surgery received 80,951 payments [3%] by number and $111 million of $475 million [23%] by value) cannot necessarily be interpreted under the same criteria as payments to other specialties. However, the implications of these payments are complex, and the prevalence and magnitude of payments seen in these data increase the need for further research into the effect of these payments, both beneficial and problematic. Research has shown that physician payment laws may deter physician-industry relationships that create conflicts of interest. 6, 15 Physicians may be less likely to accept industry payments, 15 and manufacturers may be less likely to pay physicians and shift these expenditures toward direct-toconsumer advertising and payers. 30 But there is also some debate as to whether an unintended consequence of transparency of physician payments may result in allowing such payments to be more rather than less influential because they have been disclosed 31 due to discounting by informed patients or a feeling of moral license after having disclosed such a relationship. Moreover, others 16 have found that the effects of transparency are small in deterring utilization of higher-priced drugs, for example. Many have expressed concern with the limitations of the Open Payments program, citing the inaccuracies of the database, 32 the short review period, 33 and the value assigned to research payments due to the high price of drugs. 34 In addition, others are concerned that payment transparency, if not properly contextualized, will deter physicians from entering even those relationships that are beneficial out of concern that such payments will be misconstrued as problematic. 32 The present study adds to the current literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of Open Payments physician-level data with specialty-specific analyses to evaluate differences in the distribution and characteristics of payments. Now that Open Payments data are publicly available, despite criticism of the data released thus far, 35 physicians must understand what is being reported, how to engage efficiently and effectively with Open Payments, and how to manage questions from patients and other interested parties. Manufacturers are not required to inform physicians that certain payments must be reported, and neither is physician participation in the program required; thus, educating physicians on transparency data is critical to physician awareness. The CMS estimates that 50% of physicians will have a reported financial relationship with industry. 1 We estimate that 40% of all allopathic and osteopathic physicians (324,523 of 813,123) received identified payments, nearly meeting the CMS estimates, although we expect that the actual proportion is greater. The remaining 1.7 million deidentified records may include up to 546,000 total physicians (68% of physicians by our estimates), but the actual number is unclear due to provider identifier inconsistencies. 1 The CMS also excluded 190,000 records due to delay in publication requests. In addition, manufacturers must now report payments for accredited continuing medical education activities made in 2016 and beyond. Moreover, if payers incorporate Open Payments data into certain quality and utilization measures used for reimbursement, 14 more physicians are likely to review their reports. Acknowledging the potential for an increase in physicians engaging with Open Payments will ensure that the proper support and resources are available.
Although the CMS suggests that Open Payments data be combined with quality and utilization data to improve our understanding of these relationships, 1 no unique physician identifier is publicly available to facilitate comparison with other quality and utilization, research publication, or funding databases to facilitate effective analysis. Industry reporting of payments must include a National Provider Identifier; however, the law itself prohibits publication of National Provider Identifiers with Open Payments data. The CMS implemented a search tool to help identify payments by physician or manufacturer name but does not enable broader aggregation and analysis.
However, searching for payments to an individual physician still provides organizations the opportunity to verify conflicts of interest and make more informed decisions on physician participation in influential decision making and in developing guidelines. There is also ongoing debate about whether some payments deserve exclusion, 36 with recent federal efforts to allow payments related to accredited continuing medical education activities to be excluded from reporting requirements based on the recent changes made by the CMS discussed previously herein for the 2016 reporting year.
The extent to which patients' knowledge of industry-physician relationships will impact their decision making is unclear. 3 Research into the opinions of patients regarding industry-physician financial conflicts of interest has shown that patients in clinical trials largely (90%) expressed little to no concern about the financial ties, although many wanted disclosure of these interests (31%). 37 In addition, a survey or orthopedic surgery patients found that they largely viewed financial relationships for surgeons acting as consultants for device manufacturers as beneficial. 38 Nevertheless, proper contextualization of payments is an ongoing concern for physicians and specialty societies given the potential for misinterpretation by patients or the media and the potential for use in liability claims. Industry collaborations in research are increasingly important as a result of stagnating government-funded support. 28, 29, 39 In a commentary on the potential unintended effects of Open Payments on oncology care, one author suggests that given the assignment of industry publication expenses to a physician, important research findings may be delayed and researchers may be reluctant to engage in industry-supported research. 40 The present data establish important elements of payment context that may help to mitigate such reluctance, and ongoing assessment of the appropriateness of industry-physician relationships may help ensure that disclosure does not adversely affect beneficial relationships that are becoming more common and deters those that are inappropriate. Furthermore, such payments for publication expenses, if reported correctly, would be included in a research payment if subject to an agreement, contract, or research protocol, and the separate reporting of research payments should mitigate certain concerns, especially as the program and reporting entity experience with the Open Payments system matures and physicians become more involved.
This study has limitations. First, it is limited by restricting the analysis to identified physician payments (payments linked to a physician with total confidence), excluding 1.7 million records. Accordingly, we likely underestimated the proportion of physicians receiving industry payments, and, as such, the generalizability of these data is limited. Also, we were unable to assess specialtylevel systematic differences in the excluded data. However, the distribution of deidentified general payments by nature was similar to that of identified payments (Table 1) , and we do not expect that errors leading to provider identification introduce large systematic bias, although it cannot be ruled out. Ongoing analyses of upcoming data releases will be an important step in verifying these findings and analyzing how they change over time. The CMS also excluded 190,000 records due to delay in publication requests, many of which may have been for proprietary drugs or devices. Accordingly, the incidence of physician payments may be underestimated, and we could not account for potential systematic differences in excluded records or inaccuracies inherent to the database. The CMS does not publish National Provider Identifiers in the public-use data set, so incorporation of demographic and other data of interest is limited.
The Open Payments data and these analyses, although important, demonstrate the need to test the effects of financial conflicts of interest on physician behavior and those of transparency itself in prospective interventional studies. In addition, the variability of these data between specialties demonstrates a potential need for specialty-specific advocacy as federal transparency programs and their broad availability evolve.
CONCLUSION
This analysis provides important insights into the specialty differences in industry-related conflicts of interest as the nation's physician workforce enters an era of transparency for industry-physician relationships. These data can inform transparency policymaking and advocacy efforts by specialty organizations and guide further research efforts to measure the effect of transparency on physician and patient decision making and how industryphysician relationships change over time.
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